HISTORY
of
THE 308th INFANTRY
By
L. Wardlaw Miles
1927
The Siege of the Lost Battalion
by
General Robert Alexander
THE SIEGE OF THE LOST BATTALION
OCTOBER 27, 1918
By GENERAL ROBERT ALEXANDER
COMMANDER, 77TH Division
DURING the operations incident to the great offensive
launched by the Americans and their Allies On 26
September, 1918; an offensive which, in its outcome,
marked the end of the Great War; there occurred an
incident which was given much notice by the press at the
time and which (through an unfortunate employment of
phraseology) has become somewhat misunderstood among the
general public. Reference is made to the situation of the
force commanded by (then) Major Chas. W. Whittlesey,
308th Infantry, 77th Division A. E. F., and the
experiences of that command during the days 2-7 October,
inclusive, 1918. Before undertaking to give any detailed
account of that episode it may be well to say that it is
believed that, considering as a group the 900-odd
officers who made up the commissioned personnel of the
77th Division, no superior similar group was in service
under the American flag anywhere. Composed in much the
greater part of prominent business and professional men
of New York City; nearly all of them graduates of the
first two Plattsburg Camps; it would be difficult indeed
to find any equal number of men of higher character, more
extended mental vision or keener devotion to the service
upon which they were engaged. In the opinion of their
former Division Commander they made up the best group of
Divisional officers then in Service. A misapprehension
brought about by newspaper phraseology may be also
corrected here:-the designation of the Lost Battalion had
no foundation in fact whatsoever. Colonel Whittlesey's
command went, under competent orders, to the objective
set for it in common with the other front-line elements
of the Division, performed the functions expected of it
upon arrival at that objective, and most gallantly held
its position in the face of a powerful enemy until the
other organizations of the Division found it possible to
join it on that objective. There never was, not for one
moment, any Lost Battalion, and the designation does
injustice to the gallant officers and men who made up the
command.
The position reached on the evening of October 1st by the
front-line troops of the Division touched, on the right,
the intersection of the Divisional boundary with the east
and west coordinate 276 and the north and south
coordinate 298. Thence our line ran a little south of
west, the front of the 153d Infantry Brigade being on the
southerly slope of the ridge known as the Bois de la Naza
(Map, Foret d'Argonne, 1-20,000). From the westerly
extremity of the Naza ridge our line, along the front of
the 154th Infantry Brigade, ran, as reported, nearly due
west. It was reported, however, that the right flank of
the 154th Brigade had not kept pace during the day (of
the 1st) with the left flank of the 153d-whether that gap
really existed or whether it was closed up during the
night 1-2 is not known, but it seems, at best, doubtful.
None of the reports then or since received are clear on
that point, which, after all, is but of minor importance.
Along the fronts of the two Brigades, still fully
deployed with Battalions from all four of the Infantry
Regiments in the attacking line, were, on the right the
ridge of the Bois de la Naza, on the left the unnamed
ridge which extends into the Foret proper from the west,
the partially completed trenches thereon being an
extension of and linked up with the works about the
Pallette Pavilion. The attacking line thus had in its
front positions of considerable natural strength;
positions which had been improved by trenches, wire and
machine gun nests. The flanks of those positions were
strongly covered; on the east, extending into and
dominating the valley of the Aire, is the bastion of the
Chene Tondu; on the west the Pallette Pavilion,
thoroughly intrenched, covers with its fire the
approaches down the valley of the Aisne by which the
French were to launch their attack. While these positions
of the Chene Tondu and the Pallette (respectively in the
sectors of the 28th American and the 1st Dismounted
Cavalry Division, French) were open to effective
Artillery preparation the extensions of those positions
which the 77th Division was to attack (being in the dense
thickets of the Foret prober) were not open to
observation and, consequently, could not be brought under
effective fire: the difficulties of the situation
confronting the 77th Division cannot be exaggerated.
Field Order 49, 77th Division, directing the operations
for the morning of the 2d October, was signed and issued
at 21.30 H on the night of the 1st and was immediately
started out to the Infantry Brigades. That Order called
upon the Division to attack in cooperation with the
troops on its right and left at 6.30 H, to advance to the
east and west road running through the Foret via
Apremont-les Viergettes-Binarville, to dig in along that
road and to exploit the ground to the new front by strong
patrols. Under ordinary circumstances of terrain and
available roads the Order should have reached the
Infantry Brigades within but little more than an hour
after leaving Division Headquarters, but in the Forest
all standards of comparison failed and it was probably
about midnight before the Infantry Brigade commanders got
out their own orders for the attack; the Artillery
Brigadier, being immediately with the Division Commander,
received the Order immediately upon its issue. It is
proper to say here that during the entire period of the
operations of the 77th Division in the Foret
(26 Sept.-10 Oct.) the Artillery could give no really
effective support to the front-line Infantry; this due to
no lack of skill or willingness on the part of the
Artillery but to the impenetrable jungle through which
the troops were forced to push their way:--no observation
was possible and the opposing front lines were always in
the closest proximity. It is also desirable to say that
all Operation Orders were telephoned in outline to the
Brigade Commanders as soon as the determination for the
next day's operations was reached, This involved some
small risk of the enemy listening in, but not sufficient
to counterbalance the value of early information to the
Brigade Commanders as to what they were to be expected to
accomplish.
The attack opened at the hour set but very little, if
anything, was accomplished in the way of an advance
during the morning. The 153rd Brigade was. held rigidly
in place, its effort to advance costing some slight loss.
On our right the attack of the 28th Division which, it
was hoped, would carry the Chene Tondu, made no progress
that we could appreciate, although a heavy fire was
opened on the enemy position. Nothing of more value was
accomplished on the left, the fire from the Pallette
Pavilion and its contiguous works breaking up the French
formations as fast as they attempted to debouch north of
Binarville. By about 10.00, H the entire attack had come
to a halt with no gain of any value as a result of the
effort. The Division Commander, 77th Division, learned of
this con-dition of affairs about 11.00, H and, after
giving the situation as much thought as the available
time permitted, determined to order a resumption of the
attack for 13:30 H. That determination was reached
because it was believed that we ought to be able to break
through the incomplete trench systems in our front and
that, if the Division could succeed in the effort and
establish itself upon the road which was its objective,
(Apre-Mont-les Viergettes-Binarville), the opposition on
our flanks at the Chene Tondu and the Pallette would be
greatly weakened if it did not at once disappear. The
Infantry Brigadiers were therefore directed by the
Division Commander in person to launch a vigorous renewal
of the attack at the hour designated. Each Infantry
Brigade had at its disposal a Regiment Of 75's;
immediately at the disposal of the Division Commander was
the 306th F. A. and the 247e French (75's). These were
also to respond on call from the Infantry. The
difficulties in the way of effective Artillery support of
the front-line have already been indicated; all that was
expected. from this fire was moral rather than material.
Had conditions Permitting observation been in our favor,
we had disposable ample artillery for the work in hand.
The attack was resumed at the designated hour. Again no
progress was made by the 153d Brigade, but on the left
matters went a bit better. The terrain and the general
situation on that flank deserve consideration.
Running north from the Depot de Machines, which position
had been taken by the 307th Infantry after a stiff
engagement on 29 September, lies a deep and precipitous
ravine, its steep sides covered with dense brushwood
forming a practically impassable obstacle between the two
banks and the Plateau adjoining the respective crests.
This ravine cuts in two what was, at the time, the front
to be attacked by the 3o8th Infantry, then commanded by
Colonel Cromwell Stacey, an officer of the Regular Army;
the Regiment had in its attacking front line its 1st
Battalion, commanded by Major Charles W. Whittlesey,
before the War and since (until his untimely death) a
practicing attorney of prominence in New York City. He had had the
advantage of both Plattsburg Camps. The 2d Battalion of the Regiment,
which, at the opening of the attack in the early morning (6.30 H) was in
immediate support of the attacking line, was commanded by Captain (later
Major) George G. McMurtry, a business man of New York City, and
likewise, a graduate of Plattsburg. Both were excellent officers. During
the operations of the morning hours the support Battalion had closed up
on the attacking line to such an extent that when the attack was resumed
(at 13.30 H) the two commands were practically fused into one. Both
Battalions had elements west of the ravine and thus separated from the
movements of the rest of their units; of the 1st Battalion Company " D "
was so situated, of the 2d, Company " F. " Attached to each Battalion was a section of
machine guns coming respectively from Companies " C
" and " D " 306th Machine Gun Battalion.
The 3d Battalion of the Regiment was in Brigade reserve;
a striking example of what was and is an entirely
unnecessary defect in our Infantry organization:--with an
organization of two Brigades of Infantry to the Division,
each of but two Regiments, it is almost inevitable that
the organizations will be broken up immediately upon
going into battle. In this case the Regimental Commander
was deprived of one-third of the tools with which he is
expected to do his work.
When the hour set for the resumption of the attack
arrived, the portion of the command on the east of the
ravine-Cos. A, B, C, E, G, H and the two sections of
machine guns-pushed forward, broke through the enemy's
wire, over-ran his opposition and seized and occupied
their part of the position which had been designated as
the Division's objective for the day. In this advance the
command, which went into action with a strength of about
670 officers and men, lost some ninety killed and
wounded. Conjectures as to what might have happened are
seldom profitable. It may be said, however, that it was
unfortunate that the remainder of the 154th Brigade was
not at once directed upon the gap broken by Whittlesey's
advance and pushed up to the line established by him. Had
that been done-and the path seems to have been open until
about 9:oo H on the morning of the 3d October-the mission
of the Division for the day, would, probably, have been
completely fulfilled. During its advance the command
captured two enemy officers, twenty-eight other ranks and
two heavy machine guns besides inflicting other losses of
considerable moment.
The proper strength of the command should have been about
1600 of all ranks had the units been at their maximum;
nor could the losses (heavy as they undoubtedly were)
incurred during the days of battle since 26 September
when the general attack opened, account for the great
discrepancy between those actually present and those who
should have been there with full ranks. It must be
remembered, however, that the Division went into battle
something over 2000 short of its complement, and the
strength of the Infantry Companies at the opening of the
attack was rather below two hundred men. The 308th had
also incurred considerable loss in the advance to include
October 1st, having been, in common with the other
Regiments, continuously in line, but the cause of prime
importance for the low strength of the Companies on the
2d was to be found in the extremely difficult character
of the terrain over which the Division was operating. In
the dense underbrush men became separated from their
units and really lost, an enormous number of detachments
were required to keep up communication between the
elements in front-line and between the front-line and the
units in support, and, finally, there is always a
certain proportion of men in any organization who, at
the crucial moment, find that their heart-action is too
feeble to permit their advance in step with the more
enterprising. It is well to set forth the truth, no
matter how unpalatable, and we must concede that even
American troops are not entirely immune to the vice of
straggling. The great wonder is, that having in mind the
opportunities for concealment in comparative safety, so
many reached the front-it is matter for congratulation
and some degree of pride.
Reaching the appointed objective the command obeyed its
orders, dug itself in on the steep hillside below the
road, which runs along a bench on the north wall of the
ravine, and pushed patrols forward into the jungle to the
north. These quickly coming in contact with the enemy,
Major Whittlesey put his forces in posture of defence by
establishing his machine gun units on his flanks and by
refusing his left flank, thus attempting to cover the
direction from which he anticipated such trouble as might
come to him from further enterprises of the enemy. His
position was about five hundred metres east of the Moulin
de Charlevaux, and he occupied it about 19:00 H.
The plan of action agreed upon between the separated
elements of the two Battalions (separated by the north
and south ravine) was that after reaching the objective
along the road, the troops east of the ravine would send
back a Company which, by an attack from the rear on the
enemy west of the ravine, would assist the two Companies
on that flank to come up to the line of the others.
Owing, probably, to the lateness of the hour, no attempt
was made to carry out that plan on the evening of the 2d.
During the advance the usual chain of runner posts had
been established; those posts consisted of three or four
men each, dug-in at distances of two to three hundred
metres. With the command was the usual supply of carrier
pigeons with which all attacking Battalions were
provided. It is to be observed that with the merging of
the two Battalions of the 3o8th in one command, the
nearest supporting troops to the attacking group was the
Battalion in Brigade Reserve at the Depot de Machines.
The remainder of the front line of the 77th Division
failed to make any impression on the resistance in its
front. Wittenmyer's Brigade, the 153d, did not move
forward an inch, nor did the other Regiment of the 154th
Brigade, although commanded at that time by an excellent
Colonel, give any indication of an advance to the line
established by Whittlesey. No assistance came to us from
the troops on our right and left; as before stated, the
attacks of the 28th Division on the Cherie Tondu and of
the French on La Pallette, initiated with the opening of
the attack in the early morning, had broken down
completely nor were they renewed within any knowledge of
the 77th Division. The two Companies of the 308th west of
the ravine made no effort to advance, waiting,
apparently, for the expected action of the Company from
the (then) northward.
It being fully realized that the left flank of the
Division was entirely un-protected, the French being held
south of Binarville while the enemy was still in force at
La Pallette, the Commanding General of the 154th Brigade
was personally directed by the Division Commander to use
his Brigade Reserve; the 3d Battalion of the 3o8th, then
at the Depot de Machines; while, at the same time the
Division reserve on that flank (a Battalion of the 307th,
placed in the Ravin Fontaine aux Charmes, just west of La
Harazee) was ordered to the Depot and placed at the
disposal of the 154th as a Brigade reserve . . . . .
The first information received by the Division Commander
indicating anything in the way of serious trouble on our
left came in about 2:oo H on October 3d when the
Commanding General of the 154th Brigade reported (by
phone) that he was quite sure that Whittlesey's chain of
runner posts had been cut. It must be confessed that this
information did not, at the time, make a very deep
impression. Operating as we had been for a week in the
depths of an almost impenetrable forest not a day passed
but brought with it at least one such report-the
situation being almost immediately relieved by the
advance of adjacent portions of the line. In this case it
was patent that the 153d Brigade seemed to be definitely
stopped but it was expected that the 3o7th Infantry-just
on the right of the 3o8th-would be able to advance to the
line established by Whittlesey either during the night or
shortly after the resumption of the attack which had been
ordered for daylight of the 3d. As a matter of fact,
Captain Holderman's Company (K) of the 307th joined
Whittlesey about 9:00 H on that morning. The question is
inevitable-if one Company of the 307th could get through
without difficulty as this Company, certainly why didn't
the remainder of the attacking Battalion of the 3o7th
follow suit? To that query no answer has, as yet, been
given.
The attack scheduled for the 3d October was attempted by
the 153d Brigade in something like an organized body; the
154th seemed to be very much at sea as to the locations
of its constituent units. The advance undertaken by the
elements of that Brigade followed generally the line
traced by Whittlesey's command in its successful attack
of the previous day but by the time the advancing troops
reached the trench system on the ridge the gap-which that
command had tom in the opposing line was reported to be
again strongly held, the wire over which he had passed
was thoroughly repaired, strengthened and extended to the
eastward so as to cover most of the hill south of the
ravine of the Ruisseau de Charlevaux. The attack of
neither Brigade accomplished anything in the way of
breaking through and during the day a pigeon message was
received from whittlesey giving his position and asking that support
come up to his assistance. It was also learned during the early morning
that the reserve Battalion which had been expected to cover his exposed
flank was not in position to do so; that information was most decidedly
disturbing as it was well known that the French had not advanced and
could, consequently, be of no assistance. Most serious consideration was
given to the cause for so serious a failure to comply with instructions;
it was realized, however, that the darkness of the preceding night and
the difficulties thereby inter-posed in the way of a proper disposition
of the troops should be factors of weight in any determination of the
proper disciplinary steps to be taken and it was resolved to permit the
command on that flank to remain as it was for the present although the
general situation, as related to that command, was most unsatisfactory.
Some additional consideration of the terrain in the
immediate front of the 77th Division will be of
assistance in an understanding of what followed during
the succeeding days. The apex of the Naza spur is about
1/2 kilometres west of the eastern boundary of the
Divisional, sector. Running south of the Naza is the
ravine carrying the Ruisseau de Charle-vaux; north of the
ridge is that of the Fontaine aux Charmes-.not the brook
of the same name which empties into the Biesme near La
Harazee. The two streams join at the western end of the
Naza spur, the combined stream (then taking the name of
the Ruisseau des Bievres or of Charlevaux) continuing in
its course a little north of west and passing south of
the position occupied by Whittlesey. The ridge running
into the Foret from the Pallette position ends just west
of the stream junction. As previously stated, both ridges
were strongly held against us but the wire, as we later
discovered, did not extend entirely across the gap
between them.
On this afternoon of the 3d October there was a general
conference of the Division Commanders of the 1st Corps
with the Corps Commander (Gen'l Liggett) in the course of
which we were informed that a general attack of the
entire 1st American Army was to be made the following
morning; that the salient feature of that attack was to
be a drive of the 1st Division northwestward from the
direction of Exermont on Fleville and that the French IVe
Armee on our left had promised to cooperate by a
simultaneous advance. As may be readily, understood the
situation of Major Whittlesey and his command was, to his
Division Commander, cause for the most lively
apprehension. It was known that his rations, even
assuming that he actually had with him at the time of his
advance on the 2nd the two days' reserve rations
required, must be about exhausted; undoubtedly his
ammunition must be running low and while there was never
the slightest doubt on the part of the Division Commander
that he and his command would hold out until the bitter
end, at the same time the necessity for his relief was
recognized. If the combined attack prom-ised for the
morning of the 4th went off, as it was hoped, the
prospect for a break-through seemed excellent. It was
therefore decided to throw the available weight of the
Division to the left flank in the expectation of close
cooperation with the French, and the Commanding General
of the 154th Brigade who would have the immediate
direction of the operation was given full control of the
remaining Division reserve: one Battalion of the 307th
Infantry and the 3o6th Machine Gun Battalion. The hour
set for the attack was 5.30 H; at that time it was still
completely dark within the Forest.
Heralded by a tremendous artillery fire from the Corps
and Army Artillery with which the Foret was now crowded;
all of which was directed on the front to be attacked by
the 1st Division; the attack began at the hour fixed. The
attack of the 1st Division succeeded, though with heavy
loss; no advance was made by any other portion of the
line although I was assured by the Corps Chief of Staff
that the French had reached Langon! ! This was known to
be quite impossible but to make assurance doubly sure
Cpt. Klotz, Liaison Officer, and an aide, Lieut. de
Coppet, were sent to the French PC with the request that
the French Staff send me a map, marked by themselves,
showing their actual front line. That map is before you.
As a matter of fact no element of the French was at any
time north of the road running east from Binarville. De
Coppet also reported that an officer at the French PC
said he had been to Whittlesey's position during the
course of the afternoon:--that, of course, appeared to be
incredible nor has there ever been any verification of
the statement, although the positions of the left
elements of the 77th Division were accurately marked on
the map. De Coppet and Klotz had also been instructed to
arrange, during this visit, for a combined attack with
the French for the following morning, the 5th Oct., and
brought back word that such arrangements had been made.
Full instructions for the renewed attack were gotten out;
the Commanding General, 154th Brigade, was again charged
with the execution of the operation, and, after all
possible preparation had been made on our side, de
Coppet and Klotz were again sent to the French PC to
assure as nearly simultaneous action with them as was
possible. Our proposed plan was a general attack along
the entire Divisional front with the weight of the
Division again thrown to the left flank; both Infantry
Brigadiers were impressed as fully as was possible with
the importance to Whittlesey and his command of the
operation, and it was hoped that the result would be all
that was expected . . . . .
The advance of the French and the 77th was not a simultaneous movement,
the French were repulsed before the 77th got started and the same fate
befell the 77th when they finally got under way. The day was a most
unsatisfactory one all 'round, and, as the only thing left to do,
another attack was arranged for on the early morning of the 6th, again
in combination with the
French-it succeeded no better than had the others.
You are asked to understand that the Division Commander
did not limit his activities to merely ordering attacks;
every other possible means were employed to reach Maj.
Whittlesey. His position was well-known and the Air
Service was called on to convey to him such supplies as
was possible. It was found, however, that in the thick
underbrush it was impossible to so closely locate the
detachment as to permit of the supplies being dropped
within their lines; the command therefore was subjected
to the trial of seeing the supplies of which they stood
so greatly in need, dropped outside their lines, in
positions whence it was not practicable to secure them,
so closely was the command hemmed in and so deadly the
fire which every movement brought down upon them. If one
realizes the conditions of practical invisibility from
the air of anything on the surface, covered as it was by
the dense underbrush, it will be readily under-stood how
these efforts of the Air Service were so uniformly
unsuccessful. There were no points sufficiently well
defined to furnish means of orientation; merely a sea of
green with, perhaps, here and there the gleam of water
from some brook deep in the recesses of a cavernous
ravine. All that the aviators could determine from the
air was that they were over the Forest proper, but
nothing more as to their actual location. On one occasion
a plane, driven down by hostile fire, was able to land
behind our front line; the aviators, seeing our men
coming up to their assistance, ran into the bushes
thinking they were the enemy. The beleaguered troops had
their panels out continuously until the last day of the
siege but they were never seen from the air. In the
course of these efforts we lost two planes and the
aviators operating them.
The attack scheduled for the morning of the 6th failed to
materialize, the French made no move to carry out their
part of the program while our attempted advance gained no
ground. The Division Commander was personally on the
front at the time and saw the situation for himself. The
front of the 153d Brigade was held rigidly in place;
while I was there Capt. John B. Benet, Jr., the Brigade
Adjutant, was wounded in the course of the attack they
were undertaking. Proceeding along our front toward the
Depot de Machines, Col. Houghton of the 307th Infantry
was encountered on the front line in the vicinity of the
stream-junction to which reference has been made; he was
on a reconnaissance and the Division Commander
accompanied him to where something of a view was
obtain-able through the gap between the two ridges. He
informed me that the wire was not continuous; that he was
endeavoring to get a few men at a time through the
opening and that if he could succeed in that effort he
believed the result would be to dislodge the enemy. It
was evident that care must be exercised in the operation,
otherwise an untimely disclosure of our intention would
probably attract attention to the gap and we would in all
likelihood find it closed in that event. His reasoning
seemed to be logical, in view of the existing
circumstances, and he was directed to con-tinue the
attempt in his own way.
It was this effort of Houghton which ultimately brought
immediate relief to the cooped-up Battalion; it is meant
that the 77th alone could not have forced the Foret,
referred to by Gen'l. Pershing as
"impregnable"; undoubtedly the successful
attack of the 1st Division, exploited as it was by the
82nd, had relieved the dead-lock in the valley of the
Aire; the position of the Chene Tondu was about to be
turned and the enemy appreciated the fact that it was
about time for him to go. At the same time that
withdrawal did not take place until after Whittlesey had
been relieved and it is believed that his relief was
effected by the unremitting attacks and other efforts in
his direction made by his comrades of the 77th. That
those efforts had serious opposition to overcome will be
evident when it is stated that our attack on the morning
of the 7th October cost the 154th Brigade seventy-eight
killed and two hundred and thirty-seven wounded. It is
not improbable, however, that that attack of the 154th
Brigade, attracting the enemy attention toward our left,
materially aided Houghton in his effort to filter through
the gap in the center. At any rate his advancing patrols
gained contact with the right of Whittlesey's command
about 21.oo H on the evening of the 7th taking with them
the rations and ammunition of which that command was so
greatly in, need.
The Division Commander was on the front of his line by a
little after daylight on the morning of the 8th, reaching
first the 153rd Brigade. It was found that the right of
that command had been able to swing forward during the
night and that the Apremont-Les Viergettes-Binarville
road was passable, although the roar of battle resounded
from the jungle to the north and the advance of the
Brigade was still being vigorously resisted. Passing
along the road the Division Commander finally reached
Whittlesey's command; it was found an organized unit and
in very good condition; its recent experiences being
considered. Of the 670 officers and men with which
Whittlesey and McMurtry opened the attack, the effectives
on the morning of the 8th numbered but 194.
Of most of the numerous cases of devoted courage
demonstrated during the siege of this detachment, it is
not possible to speak here; about 10:00 H on the 7th
Major Whittlesey received a demand for surrender. It was
typewritten, in excellent English, and was dispatched to
him by Captain Herman Prinz, the officer commanding the
enemy; he had lived some seven years at Spokane, the
agent of a German tungsten company. Major Whittlesey's
only reply was to take in his Battalion and Company
panels which had been displayed up to that time and to
fire at the next Boche who showed himself. The panels
were taken in by Capt. William J. Cullen, 308th Infty.,
who was greatly exposed in performing the duty and who
earned the D. S. C. by volunteering for the perilous
task-Captain Cullen is now a business man in New York
City. Major Whittlesey and Captain McMurtry were
recommended for the Medal of Honor; I am glad to say that
both received it in due time. I was able to promote both
of them immediately and did so. There were a number of
other awards of the D. S. C. to subordinate officers and
men of the command. The command itself, after resting in
Division reserve for two days, resumed its place in front
line in its proper turn for that duty and performed
gallant service throughout the remainder of the campaign,
as it had before.
Camp Lewis,
15 Dec. 1922.